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The main purpose of this article is to examine the lnds of
exemptions and privileges which the law allows on grounds of
religion and conscience.' The opening section will present ex-
amples of the types of exemption and privilege problems which
arise, with particular attention paid to the nature of the relief
sought. In the remaining parts of the article the doctrines
utilized by the courts for resolving the issues in this area will be
discussed in light of recent decisions. The general justifications
for granting exemptions will also be examined. Finally, analysis
will be made of the specific considerations which are weighed
by the courts in determining whether to grant or deny exemptions.
I. EXEMPTIONS ON REL Ious AND CONSCMrnOUS
GROUNDS: ILLUSTRATIONS CLAssIFIED
Legislatures and courts have created certain exemptions and
privileges that allow individuals and institutions to pursue freely
their religious activities. The nature of these exemptions and
privileges fall into distinct categories, and the different categories
raise different problems. The basic categories are:
(1) Privileges and exemptions which relieve direct conflicts
between specific laws and religious tenets, wherein adherence to
one requires disobedience to the other;
* Assistant Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University, now Lecturer of Law,
Hebrew University of Jerusalem. LL.B. 1968, LL.M. 1970, Hebrew University of
Jerusalem; M.C.L. 1971, D.C.L. 1973, University of Chicago; member, Israeli Bar.
1 The examination of the definition of "religious belief" and "conscientious
belief' is beyond the scope of this work. Likewise, the question whether freedom
of conscience is protected by the Constitution independently from freedom of re-
ligion is not within the scope of this work. The exemptions examined in this work
are by no means comprehensive.
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(2) Those which relieve indirect conflicts, wherein the law
creates an economic loss or social hardship upon those who follow
certain religious or conscientious principles;
(3) Relief from regulation of certain religiously or conscien-
tiously motivated activities;
(4) Desirable exemptions from the discharge of legal duties,
the performance of which would not necessarily create a conflict;
(5) Privileges conferred through affirmative action taken by
government to allow satisfaction of religious and spiritual needs
under circumstances that, without government action, would
prevent religious fulfillment.
A. Direct Conflict
Exemption problems in this category are caused when the law
requires an act or omission which "results in the choice to the
individual of either abandoning his religious principles or facing
criminal prosecution."2 The legislatures "reveal a deep concern
for the situation of the contravening imperatives of religion and
conscience or suffering penalties,"3 and to relieve the individual
of this dilemma, a legal privilege or exemption may be granted.
This "happy tradition" of "avoiding unnecessary clashes with
the dictates of conscience" 4 may take the form of an exemption
from a legal duty, the discharge of which is catagorically for-
bidden by the individual's religion or beliefs (such as the con-
scientious objector draft exemption5 ), or it may take the form
of a privilege to disregard a law which prohibits an act com-
manded by one's religion (such as the privilege to use an other-
wise prohibited drug in a religious ceremony 6).
Conscientious objectors to war are granted varying exemptions
depending on the nature of their beliefs. One who is opposed to
any form of military service is granted a total exemption from
serving in the armed forces. Opposition to service in a combatant
unit which involves killing and carrying arms, but not to service
in a non-combatant unit, gives rise to an exemption from the
2 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961).
3 Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 445 (1971).
4 United States v. MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605, 634 (1931) (Chief Justice
Hughes dissenting).5 Section 6(j) of the Military Selection Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. §
456(j) (1970).6 E.g., People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
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former only.' No exemption is granted to conscientious objectors
who oppose participation in a particular war.8
In the area of education, direct conflict between law and
religion may arise in numerous situations. For example, when
mandatory attendance in school is contrary to a pupil's religion,
the conflict is unavoidable. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,9 defendants
were members of the Amish religion who withdrew their children,
aged 14 and 15, from school. The state's compulsory school at-
tendance law required that all children attend school between the
ages of 7 and 16 years.10 The defendants showed that the chil-
dren's attendance of any high school "was contrary to the Amish
religion and way of life,"11 and argued that the state statute en-
croached upon their right to free exercise of their religious be-
liefs. The Supreme Court held that the Amish parents, having
met the "burden of demonstrating the adequacy of their alterna-
tive mode of continuing informal vocational education,"'2 were
exempt from the state's compulsion.
In In re Jenison13 a woman was exempted from the duty to
serve on a jury because her religious principles commanded that
she not judge her fellow man.
Section I of the English Oaths Act of 18881" permits an
exemption from taking oaths when they are forbidden by one's
religion,15 or when one is conscientiously opposed to taking an
oath because of its religious nature. 16 The exemption applies in
7 For discussion of conscientious objector exemptions and alternative duty,
see Redlich and Feinberg, Individual Conscience and the Selective Conscientious
Objector: The Right Not to Kill, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 875, 898 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Redlich and Feinberg].
8 Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
) 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
10 WIsc. STAT. ANN. § 118.15(1)(a) (1973).
"1406 U.S. 205, 209 (1972).
121d. at 235.
13 125 N.W.2d 588 (Minn. 1963). The Mnnesota Supreme Court re-
versed its original decision, In re Jenison, 120 N.W.2d 515 (Minn. 1963), after the
United States Supreme Court remanded the case in light of Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963). In re Jenison, 375 U.S. 14 (1963).
14 51 & 52 Vict. c. 46.
15 The Quakers' faith forbids oath taking. See their struggle in 1779 against
oath taking in CONSC~MNC N AmERcA 41-44 (L. Schlissel ed. 1968).
'
0
'Tgmr is nothng in our lega procedure which so clearly shows the influence
of religion as taking of an oath" Lord Denning, The Influence of Religion
on Law 5, 33rd Earl Grey MemorialI Lecture (1953). "ETihe oath tests so odious
in history. For the oath was one of the instruments for suppressing heretical be-
liefs," West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 663 (1943) (Justice
Frankfurter, dissenting). "The test oath is abhorent to our tradition." Girouard
v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946).
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all cases in which an oath is required (such as before testimony
in court, upon entering a public office, or before receiving a
license to practice a regulated profession), and the statute pro-
vides that an affirmation may be taken instead. This problem is
avoided in the United States by provisions of the Constitution
and laws that either "Oath or Affirmation"1 7 is appropriate. Article
VI of the Constitution of the United States provides that "no
religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office
or public trust under the United States." In Torcaso v. Watkins,8
the Supreme Court dealt with a denial of a notary public
commission to a person who refused to comply with a state con-
stitutional provision requiring a declaration of belief in God. The
Court held that such a "religious test for public office uncon-
stitutionally invades the appellant's freedom of belief and religion
and therefore cannot be enforced against him."19' (The Court
did not rule whether such a test violated the establishment
clause,20 nor did it reach the question whether the "no religious
test" provision of article VI of the Constitution applies to the
states, but seemed to rest its decision on the free exercise clause).
In another case, a petitioner in a naturalization process sought
to substitute "I hereby declare . . . in honor and sincerity" for
"I hereby declare on oath," and he wanted to omit the closing
words "so help me God" from the required oath. Naturalization
was denied by the district court,21 but on appeal the decision was
reversed on confession of error by the United States.22
Other exemptions from legal duties include that granted by
the English Abortion Act to a doctor who conscientiously opposes
taking part in, approving, or doing an abortion,23 and the ex-
17 See e.g., U.S. CONST., art. II (President's Oath or Affirmation); art. VI
(Representatives, Senators and others' Oath or Affirmation). See also the fourth
amendment which provides that warrants shall issue upon probable cause, sup-
ported by "Oath or affirmation." But see Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure which provides that a complaint "shall be made upon oath before a
commissioner" omitting "or affirmation." Presumably under the Constitution the
"or affirmation" is read into the rule.
18 867 U.S. 488 (1961).
19 Id. at 496.
20 See W. KATz, RELIGION AND AmcuC~A CoNsTrrrrioNs 6 (1964); Note,
Toward a Uniform Valuation of the Religious Guarantees, 80 YALE L.J. 77, 85
(1970).
21 Petition of Plywacki, 107 F. Supp. 593 (D. Hawaii 1952), noted in 1 KAN.
L. REV. 343 (1953).
22 205 F.2d 423 (9th Cir. 1953).
23 Sec. 4 of the Abortion Act 1967, c. 87. However, in emergency cases no
doctor can claim such exemption.
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emption from the duty to work on Sunday in times of emergency
when workers of designated industries are required to work on
Sundays.24
The above examples illustrate exemptions from legal duties;
there are also privileges to perform affirmative acts which would
otherwise be prohibited by law. For example, the members of
the Native American Church have been granted the privilege of
using peyote (a controlled drug) in religious ceremonies. 25 Sim-
ilarly, an exemption for use of sacramental wine was upheld during
the liquor prohibition period.2 6 Exemptions from statutes pro-
hibiting spiritualism 27 are other examples.
In many cases both exemptions from required acts and priv-
ileges to perform ordinarily prohibited acts have been denied by
courts. The well-known Mormon polygamy cases are examples. 28
Statutes outlawing snake handling in religious rituals have been
upheld.29  Religious grounds were not sustained for exempting
parents from liability for violation of child labor regulations, 0
and religion did not support a privilege in faith-healing cases. 31
24 See S.C. ConDE § 64-4.1 (1960 Supp.).2 5 Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967), rev'd on other
grounds, 385 U.S. 917 (1969). But see People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 69 (1964); State v. Bullard, 148 S.E. 265 (N.C. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 917 (1967).
26 People v. Marquis, 125 N.E. 757 (IIl. 1919). The exempt-on was limited to
reasonable quantity But see State v. Kramer, 206 N.W. 468 (S.D. 1925), in which
the court upheld a refusal of the state to exempt an unlimited quantity for
sacramental purposes.
27 State v. De Landy, 122 A. 890 (N.J. 1923) (freedom of religion upheld
when charter of church permitted teaching of spiritualism); People v. Miller, 46
N.Y.S.2d 206 (1963) (-statute expressly granted an exemption to spiritualist
acting in good faith and without fee; defense upheld when a client made con-
tribution).2 8 Davis v. Benson, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145 (1878). The authority of the former case is questionable, Kurland, Of Church
and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 8-11 (1961). Cf. Torcaso
v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
20 Hill v. State, 88 So.2d 880 (Ala. App. 1956), cert. denied, 88 So.2d 887
(Ala. 1956); Lawson v. Commonwealth, 164 S.W.2d 972 (Ky. 1942); State v.
Massey, 51 S.E.2d 179 (N.C. 1949), appeal dismissed sub. nom. Bunn v. North
Carolina, 336 U.S. 942 (1949); Harden v. State, 216 S.W.2d 708 (Tenn. 1948).
Cf. Kirk v. Commonwealth, 44 S.E.2d 409 (Va. 1947), in which the court dis-
missed a defense of religious belief in a prosecution for death due to snake
handling. See also Comment, 2 V.m. L. REv. 694 (1949), commenting on Harden
v. State. For a discussion of snake handling see Clark, Guidelines for the Free
Exercise Clause, 83 HAnv. L. REv. 327, 364 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Clark];
Fernandez, The Free Exercise of Religion, 36 So. CAL. L. REv. 546, 568 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as Fernandez].
30 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).31 See generally Cawley, Criminal Liability in Faith Healing, 39 M-N. L. REv.
48 (1954) and the cases cited therein. But see Founding Church of Scientology(Continued on next page)
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Courts have not accepted the argument that a father should be
exempted from his duty to maintain his children because his
religion prohibits gainful employment, 32 and religious grounds
were not sustained as a proper defense to a charge of counseling
draftees to refuse to register.3
Direct conflict between law and religion might arise in many
other situations. The taking of a suspect's blood sample for the
purpose of obtaining evidence might raise a direct conflict if his
religion forbids the blood sampling.34 If a noise pollution
regulation embraces church bells, it may raise a direct conflict
between law and religion. Refusal to pay taxes that finance war
falls into this category,35 as does refusal to testify before a court
or other tribunal on religious or conscientious grounds.36
Conflicts between law and religion might arise in the area
of compulsory medical treatments and physical examinations.
Such conflicts may be either direct or indirect and illustrations
will serve to distinguish the two. If medical treatments and phy-
sical examinations are required as prerequisites to obtaining public
licenses or services, such requirements create indirect conflicts
because there is no irreconcilable dilemma: an individual is free
to choose between following his religious obligations and obtain-
ing the public service or license. Thus vaccinations3 or X-ray
examinations required of students prior to school admission,38
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1969) in which the court, relying upon
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944), sustained a religious defense in a
prosecution for sale of faith healing medicines.32 E.g., Pencoric v. Pencoric, 287 P.2d 501 (Cal. 1955).33 Warren v. United States, 177 F.2d 596 (10th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 947 (1950); Gara v. United States, 178 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1949), aff'd. by
equally divided court, 340 U.S. 857 (1950).34 In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the Court left this ques-
tion open. "Petitioner is not one of the few who on grounds of . . .religious
scruple might prefer some other means of testing.... We need not decide whether
such wishes would have to be respected." Id. at 771.
35 For an early case see Conscience in America 34 (L. Schlissel ed. 1968).
For cases at the present time, see id. at 398.
36 See People v. Woodruff, 272 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1966), aff'd, 21 N.Y.2d 848,
236 N.E.2d 159 (1968).
37 For an exemption from a vaccination requirement in a state university see
Kolbeck v. Kramer, 202 A.2d 889 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1964) in which the court held that
a state university which exempted Christian Scientists from vaccination require-
ments could not require membership in organized religious groups to qualify for
religious exemption from vaccination.
38 See e.g., State ex rel. Holcomb v. Armstrong, 239 P.2d 545 (Wash. 1952)(religious objection dismissed). Cf. Moore v. Draper, 57 So.2d 648 (Fla. Sup. Ct.19;21.
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and examinations for venereal disease prior to obtaining marriage
licenses, 0 create indirect conflicts when required over objection
on religious grounds. Medical examinations required for welfare
benefits4° also give rise to indirect conflicts if the examinations
are contrary to religious beliefs. But if the law imposes a duty on
parents to provide their children with medical care to which they
are religiously opposed,41 or where the requirement of vac-
cinating school children is coupled with compulsory education
laws,42 then there is a direct conflict between religion and law
because the choice is between religion and criminal sanction, or
perhaps between religion and custody of the child. 3
B. Indirect Conflict
In this category problems arise when the law forces the
individual to choose between following his religious or con-
scientious principles-thereby suffering an economic or other loss
-and abandoning his religion or conscience to avoid such a loss.44
Discussing a Sunday closing law in Braunfeld v. Brown,45 the
Supreme Court stated:
Fully recognizing that the alternatives open to appellants
and others similarly situated-retaining their present occupa-
tions and incurring economic disadvantage or engaging in
some other commercial activity which does not call for either
Saturday or Sunday labor-may well result in some financial
sacrifice in order to observe their religious beliefs, still the
39E. Peterson v. Widule, 147 N.W. 966 (Wis. 1914) (religious objection
dismissed,.40 E.g., Powers v. State Dep t of Social Welfare, 493 P.2d 490 (Kan. 1970).41 E.g., State v. Chenoweth, 71 N.E. 197 (Ind. 1904); People v. Pierson 176
N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903); Beck v. State, 233 Pac. 495 (Okla. Crim. 1925S.4 2 E.g., Sadlock v. Bd. of Educ., 58 A.2d 218 (N.J. 1948); City of New
Braunfels v. Waldschmidt, 207 S.W. 303 (Tex. 1918).4 3 E.g., Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947). For dis-
cussion of these and other medical treatment problems, see generally Note, Com-
pulsory Medical Treatment and the Free Exercise Clause, 42 IND. L.J. 386 (1966).
44 "Pennsylvania has passed a [Sunday] law which compels an orthodox Jew
to choose between his religious faith and his economic survival," Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 616 (1961) (Justice Stewart dissenting). See also Justice
Brennan's dissenting opinion taking the issue of that case to be "whether a state
may put an individual to a choice between his business and his religion." Id. at
611. See Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963): "The ruling forces her
to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on
the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to
accept work, on the other hand."
4366 U.S. 599 (1961).
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option is wholly different than when the legislation attempts
to make a religious practice itself unlawful. 40
Legislatures and Courts generally recognize that although this
option is wholly different from outlawing a religious practice,
it is still a substantial interference with religious liberty. Hence,
they have made "an effort to accommodate the demands of the
state to the conscience of the individual."47 Most of the states
which have passed Sunday closing laws have provided for the
exemption of those who rest on a different day because of
religious conviction.48 Whereas the dissenting opinion in Braun-
feld found that such exemption was constitutionally required, the
majority opinion was of the view that it was not, though it
may well be the wiser solution to the problem."4 9
Indirect conflict also arises in flouridation cases.50 Where in-
dividuals are religiously opposed to the use of any drugs, the
flouridation of water supplies forces them to choose between their
religion and the expense and inconvenience of seeking a pure
water supply.51
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,52 pub-
lic school children of Jehovah's Witnesses challenged the validity
of their duty to salute the flag in school since it was contrary to
the command of their religion. The Supreme Court held that they
could not be required to salute the flag.53 The categorization of
an exemption granted in a case like Barnette depends on the
sanction imposed for violation of the flag salute duty. If a criminal
46Id. at 605-06 (1961). Contrast Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion:
"[Tlhe laws do not say that appellants must work on Saturday. But their effect
is that appellants may not simultaneously practice their religion and their trade,
without being hampered by a substantial competitive disadvantage." Id. at 613.47 Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 68 (1946).48 See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Appendix II to Opinion
of Justice Frankfurter, at 551 et seq.).49 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608 (1961). Accord, McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 459, 520 (1960) (Justice Frankfurter): "However preferable,
personally, one might deem such an exemption, I cannot find that the Constitution
compels it."
50 This conflict has generally been resolved in favor of the state. See e.g.,
De Aryan v. Butler, 260 P.2d 98 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1012 (1954); Kraus
v. City of Cleveland, 121 N.E.2d 311 (Ohio Ct. A pp. 1959), aff'd, 127 N.E.2d
609 (1955), appeal dismissed, 351 U.S. 935 (1956); Baer v. City of Bend, 292
P.2d 134 (Ore. 1956).51 See generally Nichols, Freedom of Religion and the Water Supply, 32 So.
CAL. L. REv. 158 (1959).52319 U.S. 624 (1943).
53 Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1948) rev'g Minersville School Dist.
v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
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sanction is imposed, then the exemption is clearly within the
direct conflict category. If the sanction is expulsion from school,
it can be argued that the problem is within the second category,
since the child can go to a private school which does not require
flag salute. The latter argument would hardly seem tenable,
however, because of the established duty of the public govern-
ment in this country to provide primary and high school education.
If an institution of higher education were involved, the conflict
would certainly be of an indirect nature.
An indirect conflict also faces the individual if "statutes ...
tax income and limit the amount which may be deducted for
religious contributions [whereas one's] religion requires him to
donate a greater amount to his church."54
If a statute compels workers of designated industries to work
on Sunday in times of emergency, and grants an exemption to
workers who are conscientiously opposed to Sunday work, but
still leaves them unprotected from jeopardizing their seniority
or other rights by their objection to Sunday work, the statute
creates an indirect conflict. A South Carolina statute resolved
the problem in favor of the individual by providing that "if any
employee should refuse to work on Sunday on account of con-
scientious.., objections, he or she shall not jeopardize his or her
seniority by such refusal or be discriminated against in any other
manner."
65
In In re Summers,55 the petitioner was refused admission to
the practice of law in Illinois because he had refused to take an
oath to support the Illinois Constitution on conscientious grounds.
The Supreme Court ruled that such conflict should be resolved in
favor of the state, but the authority of the case is now questionable
since it does not seem consistent with Supreme Court cases re-
garding oaths of allegiance required from applicants for admission
to the bar. A conscientious objector to war who is forced to
54 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961).
55 S.C. Code § 64-4.1 (1960 Supp.): "no employee shall be required to work
on Sunday . .. who is conscientiously opposed to Sunday work" falls within the
first category of exemptions; it resolves a direct conflict.
56 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
57 See e.g., Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Konigs-
berg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957). Nor is it consistent with Supreme Court
decisions relating to freedom of religion. See Note, Unconstitutional Conditions,
73 HAnv. L. REv. 1595, 1597 (1955); Note, A Braunfeld v. Brown Test for In-
(Continued on next page)
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choose between his religion and a certain profession which he
cannot practice once he raises conscientious objection also faces
an indirect conflict.
The English Slaughter of Animals Act58 offers an example of
a privilege to perform an act, otherwise prohibited, in order to
resolve an indirect conflict between law and religion. The Act
grants the privilege to slaughter animals, normally forbidden, to
Jews and Moslems whose religions forbid the eating of meat
unless the animal is slaughtered in accordance to certain rules.
This privilege relieves them of the choice between the onerous
economic burden of importing properly slaughtered meat, and
abandoning their religion's dictates.
Other requirements which may create indirect conflicts in-
clude oaths to bear arms in a naturalization process,0 military
training at a state university,60 mandatory disclosures of com-
munications between a priest and his penitent where the dis-
closure is not expressly forbidden by religion,6' and unemploy-
ment compensation to a Sabbatrian.6 2
C. Relief from Regulation
Zoning law offers an example of exemptions in this category
in that houses of worship and other buildings used for religious
purposes are generally relieved of zoning requirements. 3 In the
absence of such a relief provision, it should be noted, there might
Footnote continued from preceding page)
drect Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 48 MINN. L. REV. 1165, 1176(1964). However, it was referred to with approval in Gillette v. United States,
401 U.S. 437, 462 n.23 (1971). P. KuaRLAND, REliGioN AND THE LAW 47-49 (1962)
suggests that Summers was wrongly decided.58 Section 1(3) of the Slaughter of Animals Act 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c.8. In
1962 a bill was presented to abolish this privilege. See debates in the House ofLords on Oct. 3, 1962. See discussion of this privilege as to Jews, Dodd v. Venner,
127 L.T. 746 (1922).59 E.g., Nationality Act of 1940, 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 307(a), 735(b), 707.
Girouard v. United States, 828 U.S. 61 (1946); United States v. MacIntosh, 283
U.S. 605 (1931).6 0 Hamilton v. Regents of University of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934).61 Most states limit the privilege in this, way. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2395
n.1 (McNaughton rev. 1961); Reese, Confidential Communications to the Clergy,
24 OHIO ST. L.J. 55 (1965); Webb, Priest-Penitent Privilege, 46 Cm. KENTr. L.
REV. 48, 49 (1969).
62 Sherbert v. Vetoer, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
63 See generally J. CURRY, PUBLIC REGULATIoN OF Tim RELuGious USE OF
LAND 21-23 (1964); 1A L. RATHCLOPF, Tim LAW OF ZoNmr, AND PLANNING, ch.
19 § I (1956); Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment and Doctrinal De-
velopment (Part I), 80 HAsv. L. REv. 1381, 1422 (1967); (Part II), 81 HAnv. L.
REv. 513, 538 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Giannella (Part I) or Giannella (Part




arise an indirect conflict between law and religion. If, as is the
case in the Orthodox Jews' belief, one may not drive or ride in a
car on Saturday, the zoning of synagogues away from residential
areas to places to which he cannot reasonably walk creates a con-
flict between the zoning laws and his religion. In such a case,
the Orthodox Jew may avoid the conflict by staying home,64
walking unreasonable distances, or moving to a place closer to
the synagogue. All these alternatives are indirect burdens on his
freedom of religion. A resolution of the conflict by exempting
Orthodox synagogues from the zoning regulations would fall
within the second category; the exemption of all houses of wor-
ship from zoning laws-without view toward a particular conflict-
falls within the third category, as a mere exception to regulation.
Exemptions from licensing and taxation requirements, when
granted for the selling of religious literature, 65 also fall within
this category.
D. Desirable Exemptions
In this category, exemptions are granted because, for various
reasons, the legislatures deem it desirable to exempt the individual
or institution from discharging a legal duty.
There are few exemptions which fall into this category. Tax
exemptions of all kinds for churches are examples. These include
income tax,66 property tax, 67 estate and gift tax, inheritance tax,
6OTo my best knowledge an Orthodox Jew is allowed to pray at home when
under compelling circum tances he is unable to reach a synagogue. However, it is
not considered the better form of worship.65 E.g., Follet v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), rev'g Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942).
But see Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) which upheld a state statute
that required a license and a fee for holding a procession or parade on a public
street even as applied to Jehovah's Witnesses engaging in a religious exercise. For
other cases related to the problem discussed herein, see P. KuRLADrn, RELIION
AND = LAw 50-74 (1962); Fernandez, supra note 29, at 574-82; Giannella (Part
I), supra note 63, at 1397-98.66 Exemption is available to a "minister of the gospel' from the income tax
which he would otherwise be liable to pay with respect to (1) the rental value of
a house furnished to him as part of his compensation or (2) the rental allowance
paid to him as part of his compensation to the extent used by him to rent or
provide a home. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 107. Exemption is also granted to
the unrelated business income of churches or association of churches. INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954, § 511 (a) (2)(a). See also INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c)(3).
Contributions to religious organizations are deductible from income, INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954, § 170(a)(1), (e) (2). For discussion of these income tax exemptions, see
Korbel, Do the Federal Income Tax Laws Involve an "Establishment of Religio."?,
53 A.B.AJ. 1018 (1967).
67 See Walz v. Tax Comm'r of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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and the like.68 Other examples are the ministerial draft exemp-
tion69 and the priest-penitent privilege if it is granted when the
communication is not required by the penitent's religion and the
disclosure by the priest is not forbidden by religion.70
The categorization of these exemptions might differ if it were
argued that their abolition would result in interference with the
free exercise of religion. Thus, the ministerial draft exemption is
sometimes justified by invocation of the free exercise clause of
the Constitution.71 If this justification is correct, then the ex-
emption falls within the third category as a relief from regulation.
Likewise, if the justification for tax exemptions is the avoidance
of governmental involvement in religious institutions, this ex-
emption would be in the third category, since it relieves the
church from monitoring its activities for ascertaining and col-
lecting the amount of the taxes due. This view was advanced
by the Supreme Court in Walz v. Tax Commissioner of the City
of New York.72 In that case a New York realty owner challenged
the validity of a New York constitutional provision73 which al-
lowed tax exemption statutes for "religious, educational or char-
itable" organizations. It was alleged that the exemptions violated
the establishment clause of the first amendment by requiring a
contribution to religious institutions. The Court upheld the statute,
68See R. ROBERTSON, SHOULD CstvacnEs BE TAXED? (1968); Bittker, Churches,
Taxes and the Constitution, 78 YALE L.J. 1285 (1969); Giannella (Part II), supra
note 68, at 544; Kauper, The Constitutionality of Tax Exempting for Religious
Activities in Tsmn WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND .STATE 95 (Oaks ed. 1968); Paul-
sen, Preferment of Religious Institutions in the Tax and Labor Legislation,
14 LAw & CONTEMa4I. P.ROB. 144 (1949). Contrary to Paulsen and others who ex-
pressed the view that tax exemption for churches violates the first amendment, and
in accordance with Kauper's and others prediction, the Supreme Court upheld a
property tax exemption in Walz.
69 Selective Service Act of 1948, 50 U.S.C.A. § 456(g) (1964). Divinity
students are also entitled under this section to draft exemption.
70See e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 85, § 13 (1957): "No minister.., shall be
compelled to testify in relation to any confession or communication made to him
in confidence by one seeking his spiritual advice or consolation."
71 See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 874 U.S. 203, 298 (1963) (justice
Brennan concurring). For discussion of this point see Note, The Ministerial Draft
Exemption and the Establishment Clause, 55 CoRqELL L. REv. 992, 999 (1970).
The constitutionality of this exemption was recently upheld in United States v.
Branigan, 299 F. Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). As to this point see also Redlich and
Feinberg, supra note 7 at 883. It is interesting to note that the Branigan case
relied inter alia upon lhe free exercise of religon of the church members which
would be interfered with if divinity students and ministers had been drafted. But
see Note, The Ministerial Draft Exemption and the Establishment Clause, 55 Con-
NEL L. REv. 992, 1000 (1970).
72 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
73 N.Y. CONST. art. 16, § 1 (1894).
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saying "it is simply sparing the exercise of religion from the
burden of property taxation levied on private profit institutions."74
As to any conflict with the establishment clause, the Court con-
cluded that "[t]he exemption creates only a minimal and remote
involvement between church and state and far less than taxation
of churches .. ."N because
... Elimination of exemption would tend to expand the in-
volvement of government by giving rise to tax valuation of
church property, tax liens, tax foreclosures, and the direct
confrontations and conflicts that follow in the train of those
legal processes."
Exemptions from anti-discrimination statutes77 also come with-
in this type of relief. These exemptions are warranted more by
the nature of the regulations than by any Congressional purpose
to resolve a conflict or to protect the free exercise of religion.
It is quite natural that a statute prohibiting discrimination on
grounds of religion would exempt religious institutions which
naturally limit most of their activities to members of their religion,
and which require as a qualification for employment, service or
benefit a membership in the religion. Unlike the employment
area, Congress expressly provided that the exemption from the
fair housing law shall be granted only to religions which do not
exclude persons from membership on grounds of color, race or
national origin.78 It remains unclear whether such a qualification
impliedly applies to the equal employment statute since it is not
expressly provided for.
E. Accommodating Religion in Special Circumstances
In this category, the government does not prohibit conduct
or waive statutory requirements or duties. Rather it chooses to
take some affirmative measures in order to insure that the re-
ligious needs of individuals are satisfied. Here, the government
solves religious problems resulting from special circumstances
under which the individual is unable to have his ordinary religious
opportunities.
74 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970).
75 Id. at 676.
701d. at 674.
771n the employment area see Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)
(1970); in the housing area see Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3607 (1970).
7842 U.S.C. § 3607 (1970).
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Providing for "chaplains and places of worship for prisoners
and soldiers cut off by the state from all civilian opportunities for
public communion"79 is one example. Giving worship and pastoral
care in state hospitals is another.8 0 And allowing "the temporary
use of an empty public building to a congregation whose place
of worship has been destroyed by fire or flood"' is also within
this category.
In a footnote by the Supreme Court in Barnette, it was stated
that "those subject to military discipline are under many duties
and may not claim many freedoms that we hold inviolable as to
those in civilian life."82 This does not refer to a right of having a
chaplain and proper facilities for worship, but rather it refers
to the types of "freedoms" which, because of the need for uni-
formity and strong discipline in the armed forces, might be denied
to soldiers and granted to civilians.83
Providing for chaplains and houses of worship in prisons and
in the armed forces might be coupled with another privilege:
relief from ordinary duties while participating in the religions
activity. The latter would be a first category privilege if the
individual's religion compels him to participate in religious
services or to meet with the chaplain.
It should be mentioned that, although a soldier is different
from a prisoner and both are different from a patient in a state
hospital, the differences do not warrant the application of differ-
ent rules. It is true that a prisoner is behind bars for his crimes
and thus should be deprived of many of his civil rights. But
incarceration does not include the loss of all constitutional rights,
even though certain rights may be more limited than those enjoyed
by free citizens due to special circumstances.84 For both prisoners
7 Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 299 (1963) (Brennan,J., concurring). See also W. KA-rz, RELIGION AmD A [sacAN CONSTITUTIONS 21
(1964); Giarinella (Part 11), SUPra note 63, at 525; Katz, Freedom of Religion and
State Neutrality, 20 U. Cma. L. REv. 426, 429-33.8 0 See W. KATz, RELIGION AND AlvIascAN CONSTITUTONs 21 (1964).81 Abington School Dist. v. Schemapp, 374 U.S. 203, 299 (1963) (Brennan,
J., concurring).82 Bd. of Edue. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, n.19 (1943).
83 This suggestion finds support when reading the footnote in its context. Seeid.
84 For discussion of the religious liberty of prisoners see King, Religious Free-
dom in the Correctional Institutions, 60 J. Cluld. L.C. & P.S. 259 (1969). See also




and soldiers, loss of religious privileges is not a restriction required
by their station, and they can rightfully claim accommodation of
the law and the disciplinary rules, as far as feasible under the
circumstances, to religious demands. The case of patients in a
state hospital is even easier. Bearing in mind the functions and
duties of the modem state in welfare programs, it is submitted
that if a patient wants religious services and spiritual guidance
he should not have to go to a private hospital. In short, the
soldier, the prisoner, and the patient in a state hospital are all in
special circumstances (cut off from their ordinary community
services) which justify governmental acts designed to solve their
religious problems.
II. SoMm DocarnwAL ThoBimms
A. The Religion Clauses and Exemptions
The first amendment commands that "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion." The first amendment
also commands that "[Congress shall make no law] prohibiting
the free exercise [of religion]." There is a tension between the
establishment clause and the free exercise clause since protection
of the free exercise of religion through legal accommodation of
religious demands arguably violates the establishment clause.
As Justice Brennan put it: "There are certain practices conceiv-
ably violative of the Establishment Clause, the striking down of
which might seriously interfere with certain religious liberties
also protected by the First Amendment." 5
The exemptions and privileges granted to resolve direct and
indirect conflicts between law and religion theoretically raise
questions of both religion clauses. When the law which creates
the conflict happens to be derived historically from or is parallel
to a religious rule (e.g., Sunday closing), the argument can be
raised that enforcement of the religiously colored law violates
the establishment clause. Similarly, when a conflict resolving
exemption is granted but limited to certain individuals, it can be
85 Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 299 (1963) (Brennan,
J., concurring). As to the conflict between the free exercise clause and the
establishment clause, see also Redlich and Feinberg supra note 7, at 883 et seq.;




argued that the limitation constitutes an establishment of re-
ligion. 6 However, the tendency of the courts in the conflict
cases is to focus on the free exercise clause while paying little
or no attention to the establishment clause. Even in cases where
relief from regulation is involved (the third category of ex-
emptions), the courts apply concepts of the free exercise clause,
since regulation is deemed to be an interference with the free
exercise of religion.
However, the constitutionality of exemptions of the fourth
category ordinarily rests upon the establishment clause. The
approach seems to focus on establishment despite arguments
based on the free exercise clause. In Walz v. Tax Commissioner
of the City of New York,17 the Court was confronted with the
argument that elimination of tax exemptions would violate the
free exercise clause. In a footnote, Justice Brennan stated that
no question of free exercise need be answered in the case, but
admitted that "state involvinent with religion which would be
occasioned by any cessation of exemptions might conflict with
the demands of the Free Exercise Clause." However he added,
"I do not say that government must provide [the exemptions]."""
Focusing on one of the religion clauses does not mean that
the analysis will be confined to that clause. Thus in Walz, al-
though the Court focused on the establishment clause, it relied
heavily on the "entanglement" and "excessive involvement" argu-
ments 9 which generally fall within the scope of the free exercise
clause. The practice of using free exercise reasoning for sustaining
fourth category exemptions under the establishment clause has
been followed by lower courts.9"
Within the fifth category, affirmative acts taken by the govern-
ment in providing chaplains and facilities inevitably pose estab-
lishment problems. But note that the special circumstances of
86 See e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). In other cases,
though theoretically a claim for exemption on religious ground involves an estab-
lishment of religion, the court has focused, and presumably wvill cont~nue to focus,
on the free exercise clause. See e.g., In re Jenison, 375 U.S. 14 (1963); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
87397 U.S. 664 (1970).
88 Id. at 692 n.12.
89 Id. at 674-75.
90 See e.g., United States v. Branigan, 299 F. Supp. 225, 235 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) which sustained the ministerial draft exemption on the ground that it is
necessary for the free exercise of the church members.
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soldiers and prisoners are state created and raise free exercise
problems which cannot be avoided.
B. Exemptions and the Church-State Relationship
Lord Denning once stated that only in a "religious state" like
the United Kingdom, where there is no separation between church
and state, is it possible to have complete freedom of religion. In
other countries, he suggested, there always exists the danger that
the individual will be forced to choose between loyalty to the
state and loyalty to his religion." But conflicts between law and
religion exist in all countries, regardless of the status of the church-
state relationship. Governments invariably impose duties and
prohibitions which may affront individual religious tenets, and
the law must resolve the conflicts.
If Lord Denning meant that only in countries with established
religion will conflicts always be resolved in favor of individuals,
then his proposition cannot be borne out. Many countries which
separate church and state nevertheless grant exemptions from
certain legal duties on grounds of religious beliefs,9 2 and countries
which have state-established religions deny such exemptions, and
even expressly exclude them. 3 If Lord Denning meant that
countries with established religion always resolve legal-moral con-
flicts in favor of the state, even that premise of religious freedom
cannot withstand scrutiny. A better statement is that the relation-
ship between church and state has no real effect on the free ex-
ercise of religion,94 and the question whether freedom of religion
91 A. DENNING, FREEDOM UNDER Trn LAw 48 (1949).
92 The United States is a good example. Also, art. 463 of the Basic Law of the
Federal Republic of Germany; 3 P3s SLEE, CONSTITUTION OF NATIONS 362 (Rev. 3d
ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as 3 PEASLEE], grants draft exemption to conscientious
objectors. There is no established religion in West Germany.
93 Italy does not provide for conscientious objector exemptions. Several bills
to establish such exemptions failed. Art. 2 of the Greek Constitution, 3 PEASLEE,
supra note 92, at 404, expressly prohibits such exemptions, although there is an
established church in Greece, art. 1 of the Greek Constitution. See also art. 70 of
the Danish Constitution, 3 PEASLEE 263; art. 62, 64 of Iceland's Constitution, 3
PEASLEE 456. The opposite proposition is equally true: England-with an estab-
lished church-grants exemptions, see, e.g., National Service Act of 1948 § 17, 11 &
12 Geo. VI c. 64. On the other hand, Switzerland with state separate from church
expressly excludes exemption on religious grounds, art. 49 of the Swiss Constitu-
tion, 3 PEASLEE 951. See also Czechoslovakia's Constitution, art. 32(2), 3 PEASLE_
233.
94 See Weeramantry, Digest of Judicial Decisions by Supreme Courts of Differ-
ent Countries on Aspects of the Rule of Law, 6 J. INT'L COMM. OF Jumss 307, 312
(1965). Cf. art. I(d) of the International Draft Convention on the Elimination of(Continued on next page)
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in all its forms and aspects is adequately protected is to be
answered by a careful examination of the law and practice within
a given legal system.
C. Commentators' Views and Judicial Doctrines
There have been numerous attempts by commentators to lay
down doctrines which govern the issues arising under the free
exercise and establishment clauses. Professor Gianella has ex-
pressed the view that "political neutrality" and "voluntarism"
are the values protected by the first amendment. The govern-
ment, in his view, may not interfere with religious affairs by
exerting political power to create social and ideological streams
that have direct impact on religion. But governmental action, or
inaction, that results in an indirect aid to religion is not violative
of the establishment clause.
5
Professor Schwartz has taken the view that the establishment
clause commands that no imposition of religion should take
place, and any governmental action or inaction which results in
indirect interference with free choice of religion violates the
establishment clause.96
Professor Kurland has advanced the strict neutrality test, sug-
gesting that government may not use particular religions as a basis
for classification in order to advance or inhibit religionY When,
however, religion comes under a broader classification, exemptions
granted or limitations imposed should be sustained 8
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
All Forms of Religious Intolerance which provides that neither the establishment
of a religion nor the separation of church from state, in and of itself, is an inter-
ference with the freedom of religion.
95 See generally Gianella (Part II) supra note 63.
96 Schwartz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Value, 77 YAr.
L.J. 692 (1968); Schwartz, The Nonestablishment Principle: A Reply to Professor
Giannella, 81 HAv. L. REv. 1465 (1968).
97 Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Cm. L. REV.
1, 96 (1961). See also P. KUBLAND, RELIGION AND THE LA-w 18, 112 (1962). For
discussion of Kurland's view, see Katz, Radiation from Church Tax Exemption,
1970 Sup. CT. REv. 93, 102; Kauper, Book Review, 41 TFx. L. REv. 467 (1963);
Konvitz, The Constitution or Neutral Principles in RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC
ORDER 99 (1963). For a more recent statement of Kurland's view, see Kurland,
Forward-Church and State in the United States: A New Era of Good Feelings,
1966 Wis. L. Rv. 215.
98 Though Justice Harlan rejected Kurland's view in 1963, Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 422 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting), he recently adopted it in
Walz. Professor Kauper states that "it is evident that with [Walz], Justice Harlan
has now adopted Professor Kurland's thesis," Kauper, The Walz Decision: More
on the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 69 MICH. L. REv. 179, 198 (1970)
(Continued on next page)
[Vol. 62
RIGION AND CONSCIENCE
Mr. Fernandez has suggested that the free exercise clause
guarantees no more than "equal treatment" with special protection
to "worship" under special circumstancesf 9
Mr. Weiss suggested that distinctions may be drawn between
the "realm of pure belief," "the realm of religious action which
may have public manifestations" and "the realm of action clearly
public." While government can interfere with "public action,"
and, with justification, interfere with religious action having
public manifestations, it cannot do so with individual belief.'00
Professor Katz has advanced the thesis that when there is a
tension between the establishment clause and the free exercise
clause, the latter is to prevail. In his words: "in many situations
... complete separation of church and state would operate to
restrain religious freedom. Where this is the case there is no
constitutional requirement of separation."1°1
Professor Howe, who has expressed a similar view, 02 argues
that the first amendment should be read to afford churches special
treatment or governmental aid so long as such treatment or aid
does not interfere with complete freedom of religion. In other
words, the prevailing force rests in the free exercise clause rather
than in the establishment clause. In view of the Walz decision,
it clearly appears that the majority of the Supreme Court follows
this interpretation of the first amendment. 3
Although one commentator has strongly advocated the ap-
plication of a uniform test for both establishment issues and free
exercise issues, 04 the Supreme Court has recently reiterated its
long-established position of applying different tests for the estab-
lishment clause and the free exercise clause. In Gillette v. United
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
[hereinafter cited as Kauper]. By contrast, Professor Katz in an article discussing
the same decision failed to make this point, quoting Harlan's passage in Sherbert,
in which he had rejected Kurland's view, Katz, Radiation from Church Tax Ex-
emption, 1970 SUP. CT. REv. 93, 103 [hereinafter cited as Katz-1970].
D See Fernandez, supra note 29. I find it difficult to see substantial differences
between Kurland's view and Fernandez's, the latter being advanced later, other
than different choice of words.
100 Weiss, Privilege, Posture and Protection, "Religion" in the Law, 73 YALE
L.J. 593 (1963).
101 Katz, Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U. Cm. L. REv. 426,428 (1953).4 1M. HowE, THE GAmDzN Alm THE WLmmzNss (1965). For a recent dis-
cussion of Howe's view see Katz-1970, supra note 98 at 94-97.
'
0 3 See Katz-1970, supra note 98; Kauper, supra note 98, at 198.




States,10 5 the Court discussed a claim for exemption by a con-
scientious objector to a particular war and stated: ". . . [Olur
holding that § 6(j) comports with the Establishment Clause does
not automatically settle the present issue. For despite a general
harmony of purpose between the two religious clauses of the
First Amendment, the Free Exercise Clause no doubt has a reach
of its own."106
The action-belief distinction established in Reynolds v. United
States'17 and applied and elaborated in Cantwell v. Connecticut0 6
and in Barnette'19 is sometimes used as a starting point for the
Court's discussion of claims for exemptions on the ground of free
exercise of religion.110 This distinction does not define the nature
of permissible restrictions on freedom of religion and it serves
only as a starting point.
In Braunfeld v. Brown the Supreme Court advanced a dis-
tinction between direct burdens and indirect burdens on the
exercise of religion."' In each case where an individual seeks ex-
emption from a legal burden on his free exercise of religion, a
proper balance must be found between the rights of the individual
under the first amendment and the police power interest of the
state. Where a direct burden is involved, the balancing process
is unqualified and the result depends on the particular facts of
the case. But where the burden is indirect, the Court has qualified
the balancing process by laying down the following rule:
If the state regulates conduct by enacting a general law within
its power, the purpose and effect of which is to advance the
state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect
burden on religious observance unless the state may accom-
plish its purpose by means which do not impose such a
burden.112
105 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
106 Id. at 461 (citing Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
222-23 (1967)).
10798 U.S. 145 (1878).
108310 U.S. 296 (1970).
109 Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
110 See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963); Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
111 See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605-06 (1961); Direct conflict
results in direct burden. Indirect conflict results in indirect burden.112 Id. at 607. See generally Note, The Braunfeld v. Brown Test for Indirect
Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 48 MmN. L. REv. 165 (1964) [herein-
after cited as Note, Braunfeld v. Brown].
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As explained by the Court, different tests were needed for
different problems: a direct burden forces the choice between
"abandoning ...religious practice or facing criminal prosecu-
tion,"" 3 whereas an indirect burden at most causes incidental
hardship, such as economic loss.
While the dilemmas may be different, there is no valid ground
for utilizing different standards. Given that free exercise of re-
ligion necessitates accommodation of the law to religious de-
mands, forcing a person to choose between his religion and his
business" 4 is not sufficiently distinct from forcing a choice be-
tween his religion and a criminal prosecution to warrant different
legal treatment. It is true that in some cases "legislation [which]
make[s] unlawful the religious practice itself"' 5 poses a more
immediate threat to religious freedom than legislation which in-
cidentally results in economic loss. But in other cases where the
expected economic loss is substantial while the penalty for viola-
tion of the criminal statute is trivial, the potential economic loss
is a greater threat. In short, it is not the nature of the conflict-
whether direct or indirect-which should be the determinative
factor. Rather, in direct conflict cases and indirect conflict cases
all the elements of a case should be considered. Even when deal-
ing with indirect burdens the Court should consider whether an
alternative means is available which would relieve the individual
of the burden and achieve the state's goal, as well as considering
all the other elements affecting state and individual interests.
That the just suggested approach is proper can be seen from
a look at Braunfeld v. Brown"6 and Sherbert v. Verner"17 on the
one hand, and at Gillette v. United States"8 on the other. Such
considerations as administrative difficulties, economic advantage,
113 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961).
114 For present purposes ignored is the inconsistency in application of the
indirect burden rule itself whichi emerges from contrasting Braunfeld and Sherbert.
The discussion here is confined to the distinction between direct and indirect
burden which is unjustifiable. As to the difficulties in reconciling Braunfeld and
Sherbert, see W. KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CoNsTrrtriONS 99 (1964);
Giannella (Part I), supra note 6.3, at 1400-02. See also the dissenting opinions in
Sherbert. But see Note, Braunfeld v. Brown, supra note 112.
115 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961).
16 Id. (involving indirect conflict-exemption from Sunday closing law).
117 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (involving indirect conflict-the unemployment com-
pensation case).
118 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (involving direct conflict-draft exemption to ob-jection to a particular war).
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nature and importance of religious principle, and substantiality of
the state's interest are equally discussed in the first two cases
(which involve indirect conflict) and in the latter (which involves
a direct conflict).
One might ask why it was chosen in the categorization of the
exemptions to distinguish between direct and indirect conflicts
if no particular importance should be attached to the distinction.
The answer is twofold. First, in the analysis and examination of
exemptions it is certainly helpful to isolate the various elements
involved in a problem, and it is more easily done if the distinction
is drawn. Second, as has already been shown, the degree of inter-
ference with the free exercise of religion is usually higher in cases
of direct conflict than in cases of indirect conflict, and this should
be considered as a factor in the process of striking a balance
between the state and individual interests.
The balancing test" 9 applied by the Court has come under
other criticisms. The most prevalent is the lack of specific rules
governing the matters to which the balancing test is applicable.
"The consequence of a lack of specific rules," said one commenta-
tor, "is not only to deprive individuals and prosecutors of an
advance notion of their respective powers, but also to deprive the
lower courts of guidance and the Supreme Court itself of the
legitimacy normally conferred by reasoned decision."t' Another
commentator charged that "a balancing test tends to substitute
subjective judgment for objective standards."12
It has been suggested that a constitutional presumption that
the state can satisfy its interest by a less burdensome means should
lie in favor of the individual claiming exemption from a duty
or a prohibition. 12 Apart from shifting the burden of proof to
the state, this suggestion does not change the basic problem. The
Court still must evaluate, examine and resolve conflicting interests,
and the criticism of lack of predictability is still valid. Moreover,
although the Court has not established in so many words a pre-
sumption in favor of the individual, in practice it has required the
state to prove that other less restrictive means are not available.
119 For discussion of the balancing test, see Clark, note 29; Giannella (Part I),
supra note 63, at 1390-1423.
120 Clark, supra note 29, at 330.
121 Giannella (Part I), supra note 63, at 1384.
12 2 Clark, supra note 29, at 345.
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Thus, in Sherbert v. Verner the Court rejected an argument that
the recognition of the claim at bar would result in spurious claims:
Even if the possibility of spurious claims did threaten to
dilute the fund and to disrupt the scheduling of work, it
would plainly be incumbent upon the [state] to demonstrate
that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such
abuses without infringing First Amendment rights. 2 3
In the area of the establishment clause, the Court has moved
from strict neutrality standards to a "benevolent" neutrality which
leaves ample room for indirect aid to religion by granting exemp-
tions. The concept of "the high and impregnable wall,"124 the
"no aid" test,25 and the neutrality concept of "secular purpose
and primary effect"126 were discredited and rejected in the Walz
decision, 2 7 and the concept of the "benevolent" neutrality was
advanced. In Walz, the Court said:
[W]e will not tolerate either governmentally established re-
ligion or governmental interference with religion. Short of
those expressly prescribed governmental acts there is room for
play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which
will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and
without interference. 28
After Walz, the arguments advanced by commentators that
123 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
124 "The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state.
That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest
breach." Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). See also McCollum v.
Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231-32 (1948).
125 "Neither a state nor the Federal Government... can pass laws which aid
one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over the other." Everson v. Bd.
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). This "no-aid" test was later quoted with
approval in numerous cases.
126 "The test may be stated as follows: What are the purposes and the primary
effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then
the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Con-
stitution.... [Tbo withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must
be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor
inhibits religion." Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 at 222(1963). See also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236 (1968).2 7 See Katz-1970, supra note 98, at 98. Kauper, supra note 98, at 196-203.
However, unlike Professor Katz, Professor Kauper is of the view that "the secular-
purpose test will continue to have vitality in cases involving non]?referential gov-
ernment support of programs carried on by church-related agencies.' Kauper, supra
note 98, at 201.
128 397 U.S. 664, at 669 (1970).
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the ministerial draft exemption 129 and the income tax exemption
for ministers or churches130 cannot be constitutionally upheld
seem to have lost any hope of being accepted by the Supreme
Court. The Walz decision seems particularly fatal to these argu-
ments because the Court sustained a house of worship's exemption
from a property tax. It would be difficult to draw any distinction
between a property tax exemption granted to a house of worship
and an income tax exemption or draft exemption granted to a
minister. Moreover, although the Court expressed reservations
about "too sweeping utterances" made in previous decisions,' 3'
they nevertheless indulged in making no less "sweeping utter-
ances." It was unequivocally declared that "[t]he limits of per-
missible state accommodation to religion are by no means co-
extensive with the non-interference mandated by the Free Exer-
cise Clause. To equate the two would be to deny a national
heritage with roots in the Revolution itself."3 2 This would re-
quire the rejection of all arguments which rest on the idea that
abolition of exemptions would not interfere with the free exercise
of religion. 3
Of course, Walz is not the last word and the picture is not
clear. In a later decision, Gillette v. United States, 34 "old" tests
were quoted with approval, but this time Walz was added to
the list of cases supporting the Court's statement. In Gillette, the
Court said: "The Establishment Clause stands at least for the
proposition that when government activities touch on the religious
sphere, they must be secular in purpose, evenhanded in operation
and neutral in primary impact." 35 From this it clearly appears
that Professor Katz was a little hasty in burying the prior doctrines
of the courts. 36
129 Note, The Ministerial Draft Exemption and the Establishment Clause, 55
CorNELL L. REv. 992 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Note, Ministerial Draft].
130 Korbel, Do the Federal Income Tax Laws Involve an "Establishment of
Religion"?, 53 A.B.A. J. 1018 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Korbel].
131 The "considerable internal inconsistency in the opinions of the Court
derives from what, in retrospect, may have been too sweeping utterances on aspects
of these clauses that seemed clear in relation to the particular cases but have limited
meaning as general principles." Walz v. Tax Comm'r of the City of New York, 397
U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
132 Id. at 673.
'43 E.g., Note, Ministerial Draft, supra note 129, at 999-1000.
'34 401 U.S. 437, 450 (1971).
'35 Id. at 451.
136 See text at note 127 supra.
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D. Is Tax Exemption Different from Subsidy?
It has been asserted that the exemption given to ministers
from income taxation of their rental allowances 137 has the effect
of "furnish[ing] the church with a state subsidy in the amount
of the tax which would have been payable with respect to the
receipt of such allowances but for the identity of the recipients."'18
By the same token, making contributions to religious institutions
deductible from taxable income13 and exempting a church from
property tax' 40 axe state subsidies. Although these propositions
cannot easily be denied, and Justice Harlan even admitted
them,' 4' he and a majority of the Court held in Walz that a tax
exemption is not a subsidy.
More than one argument was advanced for sustaining this con-
clusion. The majority reasoned that the grant of a tax exemption
did not amount to sponsorship of religious activity since "the gov-
ernment does not transfer part of its revenue to churches but
simply abstains from demanding the church support the state."14
He also argued that "direct money subsidy would be a relationship
pregnant with involvement and, as with government grant pro-
grams, could encompass sustained and detailed administrative
relationships for enforcement of statutory or administrative stan-
dards." 43 Mr. Justice Harlan found support for the difference
between exemptions and subsidies in that subsidies, unlike ex-
emptions, are passed periodically; therefore, they invite more
political controversy than do exemptions. He also relied on the
argument that "subsidies or direct aid, as a general rule, are
granted on the basis of enumerated and more complicated quali-
fications and frequently involve the state in administration to a
higher degree."144 Mr. Justice Brennan, quoting Professor Gian-
nella, 45 found support for distinguishing subsidies from exemp-
tions on the basis that subsidies involve direct transfer of public
money exacted from taxpayers as a whole, whereas exemptions
'37 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 107.138 Korbel, supra note 130, at 1019.
13 9 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 170(a) (1), (a)(2). See Korbel, id.
140 See Walz v. Tax Comm r of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
'41 Id. at 699.
142 Id. at 675.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 699.145 Giannella (Part II), supra note 63, at 553.
1974]
K=TUucKy LAw JouNAL[
are "mere passive state involvement with religion."'46 Mr. Justice
Douglas could not agree that these arguments sustain the con-
clusion that exemption is distinguishable from a subsidy.147
It seems that after Walz little doubt remains as to this ques-
tion. In terms of the establishment clause, an exemption is not a
subsidy. Needless to say, this equally applies to property tax
exemptions, income tax exemptions of ministers' rental allow-
ances, 4 ' church income tax exemption, and to deductible con-
tributions to religious institutions. 4 9
E. Mandatory and Permissible Exemptions
The labels "mandatory" and "permissible" exemptions may
come up in different contexts. When the constitutionality of an
exemption is challenged, ordinarily the question is whether it is
permissible for the legislature to establish the exemption. When
an exemption is claimed, but not granted by the legislature, the
question is whether it is mandatory for the legislature to grant the
exemption or whether it is within the zone of legislative discretion.
Both questions arise when an exemption is granted but is limited
in scope. Those excluded may argue that the exemption thus
limited is an establishment of religion, or that the free exercise
clause aTirmatively requires their inclusion in the exemption. 5 '
The decision-making process for each question is different:
the establishment issue is a problem of constitutional interpre-
tation; the free exercise issue is a balancing of interests problem.
However, the same argument is sometimes used both to reject
exemptions claimed and to sustain exemptions challenged.
The involvement argument which, among others, the Court
in Walz used for sustaining the property tax exemption,351 was
utilized by the Court in Gillette to deny an exemption for con-
scientious objection to a particular war:
[I]t is true that "the more discriminating and complicated the
basis of classification for an exemption-even a neutral one-the
146 397 U.S. 664, 691 (1970).
147 Id. at 709.
148 INT. RPv. CODE OF 1954, § 107.
149 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c) (3). See Korbel, supra note 130, at
1018-19.
150 See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).




greater the potential for state involvement" in determining
character of persons' beliefs and affiliations, thus "entan-
gl[ing] government in difficult classifications of what is or is
not religious," or what is or is not conscientious.152
An argument similar in nature to this involvement argument was
utilized before Walz and Gillette to justify the denial of Sunday
law exemptions. In Braunfeld v. Brown, the Court said:
This might make necessary a state-conducted inquiry into the
sincerity of the individual's religious beliefs, a practice which
a State might believe would itself run afoul of the spirit of
consitutionally protected religious guarantees.153
With all respect, one finds it difficult to understand how the
same argument can be utilized both for denying and sustaining
exemptions. Moreover, utilizing the involvement argument for
denying an exemption amounts to saying that "we deny your
claim for complete freedom of religion because allowing your
claim will result in excessive governmental involvement which
will interfere with your complete freedom of religion."
The inherent deficiency of the involvement argument is that
it takes you wherever you want depending on the preliminary
assumption you make. If you assume that granting the exemption
will result in more involvement, then you can utilize it for denying
exemption. However, if you assume that granting the exemption
will reduce the state involvement, then the exemption can be
sustained. Clearly the underlying concern is whether the involve-
ment is greater with exemption or without it, but that can be a
very difficult factual question for the Court. In any event, the
Court tends to make the "right" assumption according to the
desirable result.
Coming back to the mandatory-permissible distinction, it is
submitted that these labels do not carry with them any mean-
ingful test which enables the Court to make a decision. Rather,
as in other areas of the first amendment, after evaluating, exam-
ining and resolving the conflicting interests, the Court decides
whether the Constitution compels the government to grant an
exemption or whether it is only a matter of legislative discretion.
152 401 U.S. 487, 457 (1971).
'53 366 U.S. 599, 609 (1961).
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In other words, the answer is not drawn from the Constitution; it
is arrived at by examination of considerations relating to the
state interest and the individual interest, together with other
policy considerations.' 54 After it has made the preliminary deci-
sion whether it is desirable to grant the exemption, the Court
rules that the Constitution mandates the exemption.
Any statement made by the Court or any member thereof to
the effect that an exemption is mandatory or only permissible
carries with it a value judgment which dictates the conclusion.
Statements of this type are not infrequent. Mr. Justice Brennan
once stated that "hostility, not neutrality, would characterize the
* . . withholding of draft exemptions for ministers and con-
scientious objectors . . . I do not say that government must
provide... draft exemptions, or that the Court should intercede
if it fails to do so."'55 Mr. Justice Brennan quoted this statement
in his opinion in Walz. 55
As to the eligibility for unemployment compensation of a
Sabbatarian, Mr. Justice Stewart wrote "that the guarantee of
religious liberty, embodied in the Free Exercise clause, affirma-
tively requires the government to create an atmosphere of hos-
pitability and accommodation to individual belief or disbelief,"'5
thereby implying that the government was constitutionally com-
pelled to grant an exemption to resolve the conflict between law
and religion in that case. Justice Harlan "[could] not subscribe
to the conclusion that the state [was] constitutionally compelled
to carve an exception to its general rule of eligibility." 5 8
As to exemption from Sunday closing laws, Chief Justice
Warren, after having stated that "a number of states provide for
such an exemption," said that "this may well be the wiser solution
to the problem." 59 However, he was not prepared to say that
the state was compelled to do so. The same view was expressed
by Justice Frankfurter: "however preferable, personally, one
15 4 The considerations which have an impact on the decision whether to grant
or deny a claimed exemption are discussed infra.
155 Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 299 (1963).
'56 397 U.S. 664, 692 n.12 (1970).
15 7 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 415-16 (1961).
158 Id. at 423.
159 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608 (1961).
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might deem such an exception, I cannot find that the Constitution
compels it."10
The process of deciding whether an exception is constitution-
ally compelled was well described in Gillette: "Even as to neutral
prohibitory or regulatory laws having secular aims [which means
that Establishment issues are eliminated], the Free Exercise
clause may condemn certain applications clashing with impera-
tives of religion and conscience, when the burden of First Amend-
ment values is not justifiable in terms of the Government's valid
aims. See [Braunfeld, Sherbert]."1'1
With the Walz expansion of legislative discretion as to ac-
commodating law to religion, 62 little doubt, if any, remains as
to the broad limits of permissible exemptions on religious and
conscientious grounds." 3 Thus, the main issues in the area of
exemptions shift to the problems of what is and what is not
affirmatively required by the free exercise clause.
In considering the process of decision-making, it is difficult
to make any valid prediction as to results. Thus in view of the
very broad construction given by the Supreme Court to the con-
scientious objector exemption,'" and in view of other cases
sustaining broad conscientious objections as to draft,165 it can be
reasonably argued that should the question come before the Court,
it will hold that the conscientious objector exemption is compelled
by the Constitution and is not within the zone of legislative dis-
cretion, as has been held in a long line of cases.' 66 Indeed, com-
100 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 459, 520 (1961). Justice Frankfurter
filed separate opinions for both McGowan and Braunfeld.
161 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971).
162 See text at note 132 supra. See also Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333,
371 (1970) (dissenting opinion of Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Stewart).
103 See text at notes 130-37 supra.
104 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380
U.S. 163 (1965).165 United States v. McFadden, 309 F. Supp. 502 (N.D. Cal. 1970) re-
manded, 401 U.S. 1006 (1971), finally disposed of, United States v. McFadden,
462 F.2d 4841 (1972); United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902 (D. Mass. 1969),
appeal dismissed, 399 U.S. 267 (1970). See also Girouard v. United States, 383
U.S. 61 (1946), reo'g United States v. MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 585 (1931).
166The Selective Draft Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1948), where the Court in one
sentence rejected the free exercise argument "because we think its unsoundness is
too apparent to require us to do more." Id. at 390. See also In re Summers, 325
U.S. 561 (1945); Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245 (1934); United States v.
MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
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mentators have raised this argument.16 7 However, from a foot-
note dropped by the Court in Gillette, it clearly appears that the
Court has not abandoned the view that draft exemptions are a
matter of legislative grace. In that footnote, Hamilton, MacIntosh
and In re Summers were referred to with approval. 68
III. CONSIDERATIONS FOR GRANTNG OR DM ING EXEMPTIONS
A. General Justifications for Granting Exemptions
1. Moral and Social Contributions to Society
Perhaps the major justification for granting exemptions is
the contribution that religion makes to the community. As the Su-
preme Court stated in Gillette:
Congressional reluctance to impose [a choice between con-
travening imperatives of religion and conscience or suffering
penalties] stems from a recognition of the value of conscien-
tious action to the democratic community at large, and from
respect for the general proposition that fundamental principles
of conscience and religious duty may sometimes override the
demands of the secular state.169
Forty years ago Chief Justice Stone made his oft-quoted statement
that
[a]ll our history gives confirmation to the view that liberty of
conscience has a moral and social value which makes it worthy
of preservation at the hands of the state. So deep in its sig-
nificance and vital indeed is it to the integrity of men's moral
and spiritual nature that nothing short of the self preservation
of the state should warrant its violation."
167 See Note, The Legal Relationship of Conscience to Religion: Refusal to
Bear Arm, 38 U. Cm. L. BEy. 583 (1971).
168 "We are not faced with the question whether the Free Exercise Clause
itself would require exemption of any class other than objectors to particular wars.
A free exercise claim on behalf of such objectors collides with the distinct gov-
ernmental interests already discussed, and at any rate no other claim is presented.
We note that the Court has previously suggested that relief for conscientious
objectors is not mandated by the Constitution. See [Hamilton at 264; MacIntosh
at 623-24; cf. In re Summers at 572-73]." 401 U.S. 437, 461 n.23 (1971).
169 Id. at 445.
170 United States v. MacIntosh 283 U.S. 605, 623 (1931) (dissenting
opinion). Courts and commentators requently speak about the value of religion
and conscience to society which justifies granting exemptions. See United States v.
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 170-72 (1965); Lord Denning, The Influence of Religion on




Obviously, the social value of religious and conscientious
morality justifies exemptions when law and religion conflict, but
it also justifies exemptions in the absence of any conflict. Thus in
Walz, dealing with property tax exemptions for churches, the
Court spoke of religious institutions "that exist in harmonious re-
lationship to the community at large and foster its 'moral and
mental improvement'." 171 The Court also stated that "[t]he state
has an affirmative policy that considers these groups as beneficial
and stabilizing influences in community life."172
In School District v. Schempp,173 the Court refused to sustain
Bible reading in classrooms as a means to accomplish "the promo-
tion of moral values, the contradiction to the materialistic trends
of our times, the perpetuation of our institutions and the teaching
of literature." 74 Relying on this decision, one commentator
argued that the ministerial draft exemption could not be justified
on the ground that it "would enhance homefront morale in time
of war and generally benefit the well-being of the people."1 75
Although this argument is not without force, it cannot be sus-
tained in light of Walz, which upheld property tax exemptions
for a house of worship. The argument assumes that the same
rules apply to Bible-reading and draft exemption or other exemp-
tions of the fourth category which do not involve any conflict
between law and religion. In the case of Bible-reading, the state
takes affirmative action of a religious nature, while in the case of
draft exemptions, the federal government does not. An exception
from the draft simply leaves ministers free to choose whether to
be exempt.
The combination of morality and inner duty which is found
in religion makes it an effective means for promoting moral and
social values.1 1  It should be noted that the moral and social
contributions of religion justify not only exemptions for orthodox
religions holding the traditional principles of morality, but also
exemptions for religious groups which hold wholly different
171 397 U.S. 664, 672 (1970).
172 Id. at 673. See also D. ROBERTSON, SHOULD CHURCHES BE TAXED? 191
(1968) [hereinafter cited as ROBERTSON].
173 374 U.S. 203 (1967).
174 Id. at 223.
175 Note, The Ministerial Draft Exemption and the Establishment Clause, 55
CORNELL L. REv. 992, 996 (1970).
175 Note, Defining Religion: Of God, The Constitution and the D.A.R., 32
U. Cni. L. REv. 533, 550 (1965).
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principles from those held by the majority of society. The conflict
between the traditional moral principles and those advanced by
the dissenting groups results in a fertile confrontation that neces-
sitates a beneficial re-examination of orthodox religions and society
at large. 7
Religious institutions also "uniquely contribute to the plural-
ism of American society by their religious activity."178 According
to this view "[G]overmnent may properly include religious in-
stitutions among the variety of non-profit groups which receive
tax exemptions, for each group contributes to a vigorous, plural-
istic society." 79 Exemptions on conscientious and religious grounds
are also justified by the fact that "religious or conscientious values
frequently represent an idealism which serves a valuable function
in society."180 Thus draft exemptions to conscientious objectors
may be justified "as a valuable reminder to the nation that war is
undesirable and that evil should be returned with good."' 8" This
exemption "stands as a mark of the nation's continuing adherence
to the ideal of peace."'8 2 In addition to advancing highly regarded
social ideals, conscientious objection serves society by causing re-
examination of controversial policies and keeping the issues
alive. 8 3 The priest-penitent privilege may be justified on the
ground that compelling the disclosure of religious confidence
affronts human dignity and invades personal privacy.8 4
Exemptions granted to relieve the choice between conscience
and the law find justification on the ground that the "moral con-
demnation implicit in the threat of criminal sanctions is likely to
be very painful to one motivated by belief."' 1 5 Also, a principled
individual's failure to do a moral duty results in a loss of moral
self-respect.' Hence, society's approach to the problem of an
177 Id. at 551.
178 Walz v. Tax Comm'r of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 689 (1970).
For discussion of the pluralistic society idea see Katz and Southerland, Rel'gious
Pluralism and the Supreme Court, 96 J. AM. AcAD. OF ARTS AND SCIENCES 180
(1967). See also ROBEMTSON, supra note 172, at 220-34; Katz-1970, supra note 98,
at 106-07.
179 Walz v. Tax Comm'r of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 689 (1970).
180 Clark, supra note 29, at 337.
181 Id. See also Mansfield, Conscientious Objection-1964 Term in 1965 RE-
LIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 41.
182 Giannella (Part I), supra note 63, at 1415.
183 Redlich and Feinberg, supra note 7, at 899.
184 See 104 Cong. Rec. 2179 (1959) (remarks of Representative Mutler).




individual who objects to obeying a law on conscientious grounds
should be different from that of an individual who disobeys a law
for a selfish and materialistic reason.
2. Religious Institutions Serve Public Welfare
Tax exemptions may be justified on the ground that churches
and other religious institutions serve the public welfare by spon-
soring welfare projects in various fields, such as health, education
and charity, which would otherwise be paid for with public
funds. 8 7
Whereas Mr. Justice Brennan utilized this justification in his
separate concurring opinion in Walz, 8  Chief Justice Burger
speaking for the Court declined to do so. The Chief Justice
argued that churches vary substantially in the scope of their social
welfare and "good works". To give emphasis to such a variable
aspect of the activities of religious institutions would mean that
government would have to evaluate the scope of social welfare
activities of religious institutions, thus ultimately resulting in
undesirable governmental involvement. 189
3. Historical and Other Justifications
Chief Justice Burger in Walz stated that
[flew concepts are more deeply embodied in the fabric of our
national life, beginning with pre-revolutionary colonial times,
than for the government to exercise at the very least this kind
of benevolent neutrality toward churches and religious exer-
cise generally, so long as none was favored over others and
none suffered interference.190
While admitting that a right cannot be acquired in violation of the
Constitution, the Chief Justice explained that "an unbroken practice
of according the exemption to churches, openly and by affirmative
's
8 For discussion of this argument see ROBERTSON, supra note 172, at 192;
Ciannella (Part II), supra note 63, at 545 et seq.; Kauper, The Constitutionality of
Tax Exemptions for Religious Activities in THE WALL BETWEEN CHIRCH AND
STATE 95 (Oaks ed. 1963); Kcrbel, supra note 130, at 1021 et seq. An argument
has also been made that without the influence of religion on society, law an order
would be much more precarious, and that police administration would be dis-
rupted. ROBERTSON, supra note 172, at 194.
188 397 U.S. 664, 689 (1970).
189 Id. at 673.
1'0 Id. at 676-77.
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state action, not covertly or by state inaction, is not something to
be lightly cast aside." 1'
Economic justifications have been advanced to justify tax
exemptions. It has been suggested that the property tax ex-
emption granted to churches is justified if the presence of a
church increases the value of lands surrounding it.192 It has also
been argued that church property is "unproductive with regard
to the generation of income and therefore is not a fit subject for
taxation."193
B. The Elements of the Decision to Grant or Deny an Exemption
1. In General
The considerations having impact on the decision-making
process are essentially the same for the legislatures and the courts.
Here an attempt will be made to delineate the various considera-
tions as they emerge from the decisions of the courts. It is sub-
mitted that the about-to-be-examined factors determine the cases
more than any doctrinal approach allegedly or seemingly utilized
by the courts.
First, it is determined whether the prohibitory or regulatory
law interferes with the religious liberty of the individual; and
second, it is decided whether the religious claim is sincerely
held. 9 4 A negative answer to either of these questions will doom
a claim at the outset.
If a court concludes that the duty, prohibition, or requirement
imposed by law interferes with a truly held religious belief, it
proceeds to examine the degree of interference. This focuses on
the individual's interest in the case. Then the public interest
behind the law is analyzed. It is at this point, when the court is
191 Id. at 678, 681.
192 See ROBERTSON, supra note 172, at 195-96.
193 See Giannella (Part II) supra note 63, at 552. For a penetrating examina-
tion of the economic aspects of tax exemptions see Bittker, Churches, Taxes and
the Constitution, 78 YALE L.J. 1285 (1969).194 The law is that, while the inquiry into the truth or falsity of religion is
beyond the power of court or jury, the sincerity of the individual should be
examined. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965); United States v.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). It has been suggested that sincerity should not be
examined. See dissenting opinion of Justice Jackson in Ballard; Konvitz, Religious
Liberty and Conscience 50-51 (1968); Note, The Legal Relationship of Con-
science to Religion: Refusal to Bear Arms, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 583 (1971). In
Ciannella (Part I), supra note 63, at 1418, it is suggested that sincerity should
not be examined when a new religion is involved.
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weighing the public interest against the interest of the individual,
that a multiplicity of factors plays a role. The court must con-
sider all the factors which tend to amplify or minimize the harm
to the public interest if an exemption is granted, while at the same
time evaluating the harm to the individual if an exemption is
denied.
Generally, if a statutory scheme is designed to protect tradi-
tional police power interests of the state, a court is less inclined to
grant an exception than it would be if mere pecuniary interests
of the state are involved. But it can safely be said that most of
decisions rest on the totality of the circumstances and a multi-
plicity of factors. Therefore, it should be kept in mind that the
several considerations discussed below are not intended to imply
that one factor can be conclusive of a case.
2. Administrative Difficulties
Administrative difficulties in enforcing a law can play an
important role in the decision-making process." 5 Discussing the
Sunday law exemption the Supreme Court stated that "[A]lthough
not dispositive of the issue, enforcement problems would be
more difficult since there would be two or more days to police
rather than one and it would be more difficult to observe whether
violations were occurring!"96 In response to a claim for religious
exemption from the anti-marihuana laws, the Fifth Circuit as-
serted:
It would be difficult to imagine the harm which would result
if the criminal statutes against marijuana were nullified as to
those who claim the right to possess and traffic in this drug for
religious purposes. For all practical purposes the anti-mari-
juana laws would be meaningless and enforcement impossi-
ble.19 7
Certain exemptions raise enforcement problems as a result
of the inherent difficulty in knowing whether a claimant's belief
195 See generally Clark, supra note 29, at 335; Giannella (Part I), supra note
63, at 1400.196 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608 (1961). See also McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 451 (1961): "It seems plain that the problems involved
in enforcing such a provision would be exceedingly more difficult than those in
enforcing a common day-of-rest provision.
197 United States v. Leary, 883 F.2d 851, 861 (5th Cir. 1967), rev'd on other
grounds, 895 U.S. 6 (1969).
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is "truly held."198 But the possibility of spurious claims is not con-
clusive. Thus in Sherbert the Court said that "even if the possi-
bility of spurious claims did threaten to dilute the fund and
disrupt the scheduling of work, it would plainly be incumbent
upon the appellees to demonstrate that no alternative forms of
regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First
Amendment rights."199
When an exemption is claimed which "in its nature could not
be administered fairly and uniformly over the run of relevant fact
situations,"20 then the chances are heavily against establishing
the exemption. In the context of deciding an exemption for con-
scientious objection to a particular war, the Court said: "Should
it be thought that those who go to war are chosen unfairly or
capriciously, then a mood of bitterness and cynicism might cor-
rode the spirit of public service and the values of willing per-
formance of a citizen's duties that are the very heart of a free
government."201
3. Rights of Others
Exemptions may not be granted if they result in interference
with the rights of others. In Barnette, the Court said that "such
conflicts [with rights asserted by any other individual] frequently
require intervention of the State to determine where the rights
of one end and another's begin."20 2
In Prince v. Massachusetts,20 3 parents had their children sell
religious literature in violation of child-labor regulations. The
Court ruled that "parents may be free to become martyrs them-
selves. But it does not follow that they are free, in identical cir-
cumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have
reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make
that choice themselves."0 4 Yet in Wisconsin v. Yoder20 5 the Court
198 See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 457 (1971); Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 609 (1961). As to the distinction between the question
of "truth' of the belief which is beyond the power of the court and the question
whether the belief is "truly held," see United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 168, 185(1965); United States v. Ballard. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
199 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1961).
200 Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 460 (1971). See also id. at 456.
201 Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 460 (1971).
202319 U.S. 624, 630 (1942).
203321 U.S. 158 (1944).
204 Id. at 170.
205 405 U.S. 205 (1972).
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made no mention of the Amish children's rights when they upheld
the parents' right to withdraw the children from public school.
It was held that "a State's interest in universal education, how-
ever highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process
when it impinges on other fundamental rights and interests."208
The Court's decision was based in part on evidence that the
Amish continued the educational process after withdrawal from
the public schools and "that an additional one or two years of
formal high school for Amish children in place of their long-
established program of informal vocational education would do
little to serve [the interests of the State.]" 20 7
The possibility of causing harm to others is usually much
greater when performing a positive act than when refraining from
doing an act. -08 It is in the former case that the courts usually
sustain the denial of an exemption on the grounds that it is in
collision with rights of other individuals. 209 And, even though an
exemption might cause harm only to the person claiming the
exemption, the courts ordinarily deny the exemption if the harm
is to life or limb. 10
This factor takes us to the well known Hart-Devlin debate.
Lord Devlin would justify enforcement of moral norms, under
certain conditions, even if they are not aimed at protection of the
rights of others and even if they are applied to consenting
adults.2 n Professor Hart takes the position that the state can
intervene only for the protection of the rights of others.212 It
200 Id. at 211.
207 Id. at 216.
208 Cf. Clark, supra note 29, at 361.
209 See e.g., Harden v. State, 216 S.W.2d 708 (Tenn. 1948) (snake handling
case). Refusal of parents to consent to medical treatment for their children has
not been sustained by the courts. See cases in Note, Compulsory Medical Treat-
ment and the Free Exercise of Religion, 42 IND. L.J. 386 n.4 (1966). See also
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
210 Though the compulsory medical treatment for adults was not clearly
decided, it seems that such medical treatment will be ordered over a religious
objection. See Note, Compulsory Medical Treatment and the Free Exercise of Re-
ligion, 42 IND. L.J. 386 (1966). A clearer case in point is snake handling. See
Harden v. State, 216 S.W.2d 708 (Tenn. 1948). But see Clark, supra note 29, at
361, who suggests that "where an individual's conscience demands of him as an
inexcusable duty the performance of a positive act which can harm only himself
and other fully consenting persons, that act cannot be prohibited by the state."
Clark would apply this to snake handling.
211 p. DEvLiN, Tim ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965).2 12 H. HART, LAW, LmEaTy AND MoRALry (1963). For discussion of the
Hart-Devlin Debate see generally B. MrrcrEL, LAW, MonALrrY AND RELICION
in A SEcuLAR SocmrY (1967).
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seems that the courts, reflecting, so to speak, the "sense of com-
munity," are following the Devlin theory.
4. Hopelessness of Coercion
The hopelessness of coercing a person to discharge a duty to
which he is religiously or conscientiously opposed is an important
consideration in two respects. First, such person, if coerced, will
not discharge the duty properly. Thus "the hopelessness of con-
verting a sincere conscientious objector into an effective fighting
man713 justifies the granting of draft exemption. Likewise, an
individual who is coerced to "judge" his fellow men against his
religious belief is likely to return a verdict substantially colored
by the emotional stress under which the coercion places him.214
Second, sincere religious and conscientious objectors would rather
go to jail than discharge the duty in violation of their religious
and conscientious principles. -2 15
5. Number of Claimants of the Exemption
The number of persons who can possibly lay claim to an ex-
emption might have an impact on the decision to grant or deny
an exemption. The greater the number, the greater the in-
clination of the court to deny the exemption, and vice versa.
Thus, Professor Clark has suggested that "[a] religious privilege
to smoke marijuana might be workable if only a handful of
persons in the United States could establish the requisite re-
ligious interest, but absent assurance of this the right probably
does not exist."216 In Sherbert v. Verner the Court relied on the
small number of possible claimants for sustaining an exemption.2 r
Likewise, the number of conscientious objectors to war has been
213 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 833, 369 (1970). See also Gillette v.
United States, 401 U.S. 437, 456 (1971).
2 1 4 Cf. Giannella (Part I), supra note 63, at 1410. This argument was not
utilized by the court in In re Jenison, 125 N.W.2d 588 (Minn. 1963). There the
court ruled that the state interest in maintaining an effective jury system would
not be materially hindered by the exemption.
215 Cf. Clark, supra note 29, at 335-36. Several thousand conscientious ob-
jectors to war have chosen jail rather than entry to the armed forces. See White,
Processing Conscientious Objector Claims: A Constitutional Inquiry, 56 CALF.
L. R zv. 652, 674 (1968).
216 Clark, supra note 29, at 332.
217 The Court pointed out that of 150 or more Adventists in the place where
petitioner lived only she and another one had not found an employment whichdid not require Saturday work, 374 U.S. 898, 407 (1966).
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regarded as an important factor for the decision to grant or deny
a draft exemption.218
6. Economic Advantage
When an exemption would give its claimant an economic
advantage over other persons, denial of the exemption or legisla-
tive imposition of an alternative duty is likely. In Braunfeld v.
Brown, the Court supported the denial of Sunday laws exemption
on the ground that "to allow only people who rest on a day other
than Sunday to keep their business open on that day might well
provide those people with an economic advantage over the
competitors who must remain closed on that day."219
Speaking of the draft laws, Professor Giannella observed that
"Unconditional exemption would confer a very substantial eco-
nomic advantage on those who could continue to pursue their
private interests while their fellow citizens were conscripted into
military service."220 Therefore, the scheme establishing the ex-
emption imposes on conscientious objectors alternative duty in
lieu of military service.221
7. Legislative Judgment
As in other areas of the first amendment, legislative judgment
plays an important role in the decision-making process.222 Thus
in Sherbert v. Verner the Court sustained an exemption by relying
on a general statutory scheme which granted exemption to Sun-
day worshippers. 22 Likewise, in In re Jenison,224 the Court sup-
ported its conclusion that an exemption from jury service should
be granted on the ground that the statutory scheme already
granted the exemption to certain classes of people. Of course,
218 See MacGill, Selective Conscientious Objection: Divine Will and Legisla-
tive Grace, 54 VA. L. REv. 1355, 1381-82 (1968); Mansfield, Conscientious Obiec-
tion-1964 Term, 1965 RELION AD TrE PUBLIC ORDER 45-6; Note, The Con-
scientious Objector and the First Amendment: There but for the Grace of God
3... 84 U. Cm. L. REv. 79, 103-04 (1966).
219 366 U.S. 599, 609 (1961).
220 Giannella (Part I), supra note 63, at 1411.2 21 For discussion of the alternative duty of conscientious objectors, see Redlich
and Feinberg, supra note 7, at 898.
222 1. EM ESON, TOWARD A G .ERAL THEORY OF THE FiRST AmENDMENT 55
(1963).
223 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
24 125 N.W.2d 588 (Minn. 1963) (on remand from the Supreme Court).
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the courts also deny exemptions pursuant to legislative judg-
ments.
225
It seems, therefore, that when a general statutory scheme
affords a basis for sustaining an exemption, the courts are inclined
to grant the exemption. Bearing this in mind, it is an interesting
question whether a court would exempt a priest from reporting
a crime which he discovers through religious communications
if a general statutory scheme provides for a priest-penitent priv-
ilege.
8. Importance of Religious Principle
When a conflict is between the law and fundamental prin-
ciples of religion and conscience, courts are more inclined to
grant an exemption than when the religious principle involved
is not a central tenet of the religion.220
In Sherbert v. Verner the Court regarded the observance of
the Sabbath as "a cardinal principle" of the faith of Seventh Day
Adventists. 21  In People v. Woody, 22 sustaining an exemption
from the drug laws, the court noted that peyote played "a central
role in the ceremony and practice of the Native American Church"
and that the "ceremony marked by the sacremental use of peyote
composes the cornerstone of the peyote religion."220 Distinguish-
ing Woody, the Fifth Circuit pointed out in the Leary case 230
that the use of marijuana was not a central tenet of Hinduism and
it was not used by Hindus universally.
Professor Konvitz231 has criticized this approach, because it
is very difficult to decide what is "a fundamental principle," "a
central tenet," or a "cornerstone" of religion. He argues that
sometimes there are disputes even within a given religion as to
what are the central tenets of the religion. This being so, it seems
225 See e.g., Harden v. State, 216 S.W. 708, 710 (Tenn. 1948). See also Leary
v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (1967).
226 In Gillette, the Court used language which seems to reaffirm the approach
of according more protection to fundamental principles: "fundamental principles of
conscience and religious duty may sometime override the demands of a secular
state." 401 U.S. 437, 445 (1971) (emphasis added). Worship is also accorded
more protection, see Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1943).
2273 74 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
228 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
229 The court also said that "to forbid the use of peyote is to remove the
theological heart of peyotism." Id. at 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74 (1964).
230 Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (1967).231 M. KoNvrrz, RELIGIOUS LmErTY AxD CoNscmNcE 78-79 (1968).
[VoL 62
RELIGION AND CONSCIENCE
difficult to understand how the courts can determine such ques-
tions.
The courts' inclination to grant an exemption when the law
is in conflict with a central tenet of religion should not be read
to mean that the state may not prohibit any activity which hap-
pens to be a central tenet of a particular religion. As always, the
gravity and importance of the public interest must be con-
sidered.232
9. The Religious Sect
In discussing the difficulties of operating a draft system which
would exempt conscientious objectors from "particular" wars, the
Supreme Court referred to "a danger of unintended religious dis-
crimination-a danger that a claim's chances of success would be
greater the more familiar or salient the claim's connection with
conventional religiousity could be made to appear."233
Commentators have charged that the courts have shown
some reluctance to allow claims from unpopular, less familiar,
non-orthodox religions. One commentator stated that "the Mor-
mon polygamy cases and the cases upholding compulsory vac-
cination requirements stand as recurring testaments of the Court's
preference for prevailing morality over religious liberty or radical
dissenters."234 Another commentator, discussing the ministerial
draft exemption, charged that "ministers of the more orthodox
sects generally have little trouble in obtaining draft exemptions,
while those serving sects relying on a lay or volunteer ministry
often encounter difficulty."235 Not only have the courts shown
the inclination to favor orthodox religions, commentators have
done so too.236
Confining exemptions to religions which do not discriminate
on grounds of color, race or national origin, as Congress has done
232 The snake handling statutes, for example, forbid the fundamental ceremony
and form of worship of the Holiness Church. Nevertheless, they were upheld.
233 Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 457 (1971).
234 Giannella (Part I), supra note 63, at 1385.
235 Note, Ministerial Draft, supra note 129, at 998. For discussion of the role
of prejudice see Comment Ministerial Exemption from Selective Service System,
19 SYnAcusE L. lsmv. 996 (1968).
236 The concept of natural theology suggested by Giannella (Part I), supra
note 63, at 1480-81, does not seem to put on equal footing all religions. One
commentator discussing this suggestion said: 'It seems hard to formulate and
harder still to defend:' Clark, supra note 29, at 337.
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in the Fair Housing Laws,.. should not be taken as Congress'
"preference for prevailing morality over religious liberty of radical
dissenters."238 Such discrimination is not "compatible with the
political concepts and traditions embodied in our Constitution"230
and should not be upheld or encouraged by a government charged
with the duty to eliminate the improper discrimination.
In cases of unknown, non-orthodox or unpopular sects, the
courts tend to stress the possibility of fraudulent claims.40 Per-
haps then, organized religions have less trouble in obtaining
exemptions than unorganized ones.24  Bearing in mind that
fraudulant claims are more likely when the religion is unknown,
it seems that it is reasonable to stress the possibility of fraudulent
claims in cases of unknown or unorganized religions. 42 But the
true question is whether the public interest in preventing fraudu-
lent claims outweighs the damage to religious liberty which re-
sults from the emphasis on fraudulent claims in cases of unpopular
religions. The answer to this question requires a difficult value
judgment.
10. Techniques Minimizing the Harm to Public Interest
The existence of techniques for minimizing potential harm
to the public interest may play an important role in the deter-
mination to grant an exemption. A prime technique is alternative
duty, and it can eliminate several considerations militating against
giving an exemption. If a substitute burden is imposed on an
individual which is as onerous as the duty from which he seeks
exemption, then it is unlikely that he will seek the exemption
fraudulently. Alternative duty may indemnify the public, to
some extent, for the loss resulting from an exemption, and it may
eliminate an economic advantage which the exempted individual
might have, absent alternative duty.
237 See note 78 supra.
238 See text at note 235 supra.2 39 WaIz v. Tax Comm'r of the City of New York, 897 U.S. 664, 669 n.2
(1970).240 Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967); State v. Big Ship,
243 P. 1067 (Mont. 1926); State v. Bullard, 148 S.E.2d 565 (N.C. 1965).
241 Compare People v. Woody, 61 Cal.2d 716, 394 P.2d 813 (1964) with
Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967); State v. Bullard, 148
S.E.2d 565 (N.C. 1965).
242 Cf. Clark, supra note 29, at 335; Ciannella (Part I), supra note 63, at
1408.
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Alternative duty, however, is not feasible when the individual
claims a privilege to perform an act otherwise prohibited. Nor
is it feasible when the public interest can be served only by a
particular individual, as, for example when the only witness
available objects to testifying on religious grounds.
Another technique is the employment of alternative means
to achieve the state's goals. The issue here is whether the
alternative means are as effective and inexpensive as those which
interfere with religious liberty. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,245 the Court
noted that "The Amish alternative to formal secondary school
education has enabled them to function effectively in their day-to-
day life ...this is strong evidence that they are capable of
fulfilling the social and political responsibilities of citizenship
without compelled attendance beyond the eighth grade at the
price of jeopardizing their free exercise of religious belief."244
11. Action Versus Inaction
The degree of government interference with religion is always
a relevant consideration: the greater the interference, the better
the chances for relief. When the law commands an individual to
perform an act in violation of his religious belief, it is considered
a greater interference with religious liberty than when the law
prohibits an act required by religion.245 The difference lies in the
degree of compromise available: "inaction frequently represents
an individual's compromise between violating his conscience and
actively interfering with the right of others to act in ways which
he disapproves."246 When the law compels an act, this compromise
is lost.
CONCLUSION
The categorization of exemptions suggested in the opening
section can help in determining their constitutionality and in
deciding whether an exemption should be granted. Recent deci-
sions of the Supreme Court have broadened the zone of legislative
discretion for accommodating law to religion,241 but the decisions
243 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
244 Id. at 225.
245 Giannella (Part I), supra note 63, at 1422.
246 Clark, supra note 29, at 346.
247 Waz v. Tax Commr of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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at the same time indicate that the Court is narrowing the zone in
which the legislature is affirmatively required to make accom-
modation.2 48 The "benevolent neutrality" doctrine leaves ample
room for legislatures to accommodate the free exercise values, if
so desired. Yet the question whether an exemption claimed by
an individual on religious or conscientious grounds should be
granted remains dependent upon a balancing test, and it has been
suggested that specific considerations in fact determine ex-
emptions rather than doctrinal approaches.
248 Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 n.23 (1971). See text at note
150 supra.
